Is the Official Theory of Mind Absurd?

Abstract

The possibility has recently been discussed (e.g. Fodor (1968), p. 93) that the everyday and technical language of psychology, our ascription of mental conduct concepts, should be understood by likening them to the process of postulating theoretical entities in science. This suggests that one way of looking at the 'official theory of mind' as outlined as a target of attack by Ryle (1949) would be to see it as an embryonic explanatory theory of behaviour. It would then seem to be a system of ideas whose status would be rather like that of, say, atomism before Dalton. A consequence of seeing the official theory of mind in this way is that it brings with it a means of putting Ryle's arguments in a new light. They could be transposed and turned into arguments against embryonic atomist theories. It might be that these arguments can be appraised more clearly in this transposed form. This technique of transposing Rylean arguments has already been used by Fodor (1968, p. 19) to examine Ryle's objections to the para-mechanical aspects of the official theory. The more general use of this technique can also be seen as carrying out the programme sketched long ago by Hofstadter (i95') who pointed out the 'nominalism' of the Concept of Mind (hereafter CM) and observed that it seemed to extend to Ryle's view of science. To ensure that the transposition is a faithful one which preserves both the structure and the point of Ryle's arguments, crucial passages will be taken from CM and by a few alterations of words, such as putting 'atom' instead of 'mind', Ryle's own sentence structures will be used as the vehicle for the anti-atomist argument. Not all of the large number of arguments in CM can be treated in this way, but a number of Ryle's most typical moves will be examined. This should go some way, although only some way, towards fulfilling the programme of showing that the official theory of mind is not guilty of the charge of logical absurdity which Ryle tries to fasten upon it.