Is the incumbent crying or laughing: when does the entrant adopt the market expansion entry strategy?

Abstract

PurposeIt is only logical that a firm aims to make a profit after entering the market. However, some firms enter the market with the goal of market expansion and even burn money to pursue market share, which is counterintuitive in practice. To explore the theoretical foundations behind this rare phenomenon, this paper focuses on discussing the impact of the market expansion entry strategy on the entrant firm and the incumbent firm.Design/methodology/approachUsing a game theory model of a supply chain with an incumbent and an entrant, this paper explores the mathematical conditions for the entrant to adopt either the traditional or the market expansion entry strategy and investigates the incumbent’s benefits and losses under different entry strategies.FindingsThe results show that when the market-expansion effect and the selling price ceiling are moderate, the entrant firm always adopts the market expansion entry strategy, and the incumbent firm obtains a free ride from the entrant firm and benefits from it. The entire industry profits and the industry consumer surplus are increased. In particular, we further investigate the cases in which the incumbent firm has a first-mover advantage or there is a troublesome cost, and the results confirm the aforementioned conclusions.Originality/valueBy considering market share as the entrant’s goal, this paper contributes to the dual-purpose literature. Moreover, based on the model’s mathematical results, this paper offers relevant management insights for the entrant and its stakeholders in the e-commerce platform.