Abstract

In the decision RPZ 21/2005 issued on 21 July 2005, the UOKiK President established an infringement of Article 8(2)(5) and (1) of the Act of 15 December 2000 on Competition and Consumer Protection (hereafter, Competition Act 2000) by the poultry producer DROP S. A. (hereafter, DROP). DROP was found to have abused its dominant position in the purchase markets of duck hatching eggs and goose hatching eggs. The competition authority identified abuses in the form of: − counteracting the formation of conditions necessary for the emergence or development of competition (in this case – in the veterinary services market), and − the imposition of unfair trading conditions.

Highlights

  • In the decision RPZ 21/2005 issued on 21 July 2005, the UOKiK President established an infringement of Article 8(2)(5) and (1) of the Act of 15 December 2000 on Competition and Consumer Protection[1] by the poultry producer DROP S.A

  • The Supreme Court seemed to be of the opinion that the lower instance courts and the UOKiK President failed to sufficiently prove the leveraging of dominance held on one market onto another market

  • Agreeing with the conclusions reached by the Supreme Court, it is truly surprising that no attempt has been made by the UOKiK President to determine which conditions, necessary for the emergence or development of competition in the veterinary services market, could not have emerged due to DROP’s conduct in the purchase markets of duck hatching eggs and goose hatching eggs

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Summary

Foreclosure of the veterinary services market

The Supreme Court stated that DROP’s conduct in the purchase markets of duck hatching eggs and goose hatching eggs had not counteracted the formation of the conditions necessary for the emergence or development of competition in the veterinary services market. Market foreclosure effects can occur in the market where the dominant firm acts (and where it holds a dominant position) or on a derivative or linked market[3] called by Polish jurisprudence a related/ neighbouring market. The latter type of foreclosing practices is known as the ‘transfer of dominance’ or ‘leveraging’[4]. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, to classify a practice as a transfer of dominance, it must be shown that the dominant firm has an economic interest (incentive) in the foreclosure of the related market.

YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
Relevant markets
Imposition of unfair trading terms
Unfairness of trading terms
Final remarks
Full Text
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