Is the cure worse than the disease? The effect of emerging market MNEs on host country corruption

Abstract

In recent years, there has been an exponential increase in the amount of foreign investment by emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs). While it has been debated whether EMNEs strengthen or weaken the institutions in host countries they invest in, the literature has paid limited attention to how EMNE investment impacts corruption in other emerging markets, one of the most significant destinations of EMNEs. Following Hoskisson et al. (2013), we categorize two types of emerging markets as targets of EMNE investment, a) low-income emerging markets and b) middle-income emerging markets, based on their institutional and market development. Building on the theory of firm-specific advantages (FSAs) and the institutional advantage (IA) of EMNEs, we reason that EMNEs enter foreign markets in accordance to where their skills and competencies can be effectively utilized, and this impacts corruption in the host country. We make two key arguments: (1) EMNEs predominantly use their IA in low-income emerging markets, which in the long term increases corruption in the host market, and (2) EMNEs predominantly use their FSAs to gain competitive advantage in middle-income emerging markets, which decreases corruption in the host market. Empirical analysis of Chinese outward FDI from the 2008-2018 period supports our hypotheses. Our research contributes to both the literature on EMNEs and corruption.