Is the criminalization of informal payment a good idea? The role of the free choice of physician in the elimination of the phenomenon

Abstract

In Hungary, the new act on the employment status of health workers aims at the elimination of informal payments by the strict separation of public and private care, by a significant increase of the salary of medical doctors and with the criminalization of giving and accepting informal payments. In this study, which is based on our former research, an analysis of the Hungarian judicial practice and an internet research focused on obstetrics, we examine whether the chosen tools are appropriate to achieve this goal, and if not, how the provisions of law should be modified. Both the theoretical considerations and the empirical evidence suggest that the approach the act took is wrong, because the majority of patients are not paying to compensate the doctors for their low salary. Patients pay because they think that they will not get the necessary care without it. This fee-for-service type informal payment is not corruption and it originates from health system shortages, which is not addressed by the act. On the contrary, the full implementation of the provisions of the act might even increase these shortages, which paradoxically can lead to the amplification of the phenomenon. According to the international experiences, long-term measures aiming at the easing of shortages, in themselves, are not sufficient to roll back this undesirable phenomenon, if they are not coupled with a short-term quick fix intervention, which creates a formal substitution mechanism allowing patients to buy the services associated with informal payments legally. The free choice of doctor is perceived to be an additional service to be paid for by the majority of patients and doctors, despite that, according to the current regulations, it is part of the public benefit package and should be available free of charge. Hence, informal payments could be formalized in the frame of the free choice of doctor and health care provider by making it a chargeable service. Such an approach is not unfamiliar in the Hungarian health policy, judicial practice, and even private obstetric care. Moreover, there is a government-supported obstetric model program in the public system in Hungary, where an explicit goal is to replace informal payments with formal fees to be paid by the patients for the free choice of the obstetrician who attends the delivery. All of these seem to be realistic starting points to introduce a technically and politically feasible pilot project, but the detailed regulations should be designed so that the involved health workers have no financial interest to discriminate against non-paying patients. To achieve this, we recommend that the attending physicians are also paid a fee even if they care for a patient, who did not choose them and pay them out of pocket, but live in the catchment area of the health service delivery organization, which is obliged to care for the local residents. Obviously, the source of this fee, which is eventually a performance-based component of the income of physicians, in this case, has to be the social health insurance scheme.