Is the Conceptual Eurocentrism So Much Frightening?

Abstract

The article is a response to the criticism of “conceptual Eurocentrism” expressed in the paper by A.A. Krushinsky at the Round Table on the Geography of Rationality on April 25, 2019. It deals with the main thesis of A.A. Krushinsky that in cross-cultural philosophical studies the Western conceptual matrix currently defines a single conceptual space for all participants, the language of Western philosophy acts as a trans-civilizational language in the world philosophy. The author of the article agrees with the main thesis, however she does not agree with its arguments and two consequences: (a) it is necessary to consider Western rationality as “rationality as such,” and (b) there is no multi-polarity in the current philosophy though there are a lot of traditions of philosophical discourse, which identify and articulate themselves by means of Western conceptuality (that is why we may speak on so-called “philosophical geography” only). The arguments do not stand comparison with the search of future philosophy, conducted now by the world philosophical community. The search is aiming to equality of all philosophical traditions. The article proves that conceptual Eurocentrism is not so much a danger as an objective necessity. Its spread is a manifestation of tendency to creative mutual borrowing of cultural inventions. The tendency always had place, but it was not so obvious in the conditions of preglobal history. The consequences of Krushinskiy’s thesis are refuted by the evidence that the Western philosophers denied to use the concept universal rationality and began studies of the various types of rationality. The author also provides an example of the creative borrowing and use of European concepts “rationality,” “positive knowledge,” “truth,” “scientific method,” “hypothesis” by the Indian philosopher of science B. Seal, who applied these concepts to the Indian material.