Is the auditory system cognitively penetrable?

Berit Brogaard,Dimitria Electra Gatzia

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01166

Berit Brogaard, Dimitria Electra Gatzia

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01166

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Abstract

According to the hierarchical model of sensory information processing, sensory inputs are transmitted to cortical areas, which are crucial for complex auditory and speech processing, only after being processed in subcortical areas (Hickok and Poeppel, 2007; Rauschecker and Scott, 2009). However, studies using electroencephalography (EEG) indicate that distinguishing simultaneous auditory inputs involves a widely distributed neural network, including the medial temporal lobe, which is essential for declarative memory, and posterior association cortices (Alain et al., 2001; Squire et al., 2004). More recent studies have even demonstrated plasticity of auditory signals as low as the brainstem (Suga, 2008). Collectively, studies suggest that the functional architecture of perceptual processing involves primarily top-down modulation (Suga et al., 2002; Gilbert and Li, 2013; Chandrasekaran et al., 2014). Top-down influences exerted throughout the auditory systems (Lotto and Holt, 2011) include: memory (Goldinger, 1998)1, attention (Choi et al., 2014), which has been found to modulate auditory encoding in the cochlea, a subcortical area (Maison et al., 2001), (prior) knowledge of syntax or words (Ganong, 1980; Warren, 1984)2, and experience-based expectations pertaining to the speaker's accent (Deutsch, 1996; Deutsch et al., 2004; Irino and Patterson, 2006), gender (Johnson et al., 1999), and vocal folds or tract (Irino and Patterson, 2002; Patterson and Johnsrude, 2008).

Highlights

Specialty section: This article was submitted to Cognition, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology
The reason is that such topdown influences, cognitive in nature, are distinct from discursive thoughts that stand in a semantically-coherent relation to the phenomenology or content of experience, for instance, thoughts proceeding by argumentation or reasoning rather than by intuition or implicit hypothesis internal to the visual system3
If we insisted that instances of top-down modulation be counted as instances of cognitive penetration, the debate about cognitive penetrability would be trivial and, unmotivated since studies clearly indicate that such top-down modulation in visual perception is extensive

Summary

Introduction

Specialty section: This article was submitted to Cognition, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology. Brogaard and Gatzia (in press) have argued that top-down modulation on visual processes involving prior-knowledge, experience based expectation, or memory do not threaten the CIT, even after acknowledging that such influences are cognitive in nature (see Pylyshyn, 1999; Raftopoulos, 2001).

Results

Conclusion