Is the Arrow’s Flight a Process?

Abstract

Zeno’s famous arrow’s paradox has troubled philosophers for a long time. In the aftermath of Russell’s discussion of the paradox in terms of the calculus, I argue that the paradox leaves a lingering question as to how our everyday, pre-theoretical notions of the motion of objects (such as arrows) intermesh with the mathematical physics thought to fully account for them. Starting from Russell and Salmon’s reformulations of the arrow paradox in terms of ‘at-at’ theories of motion, I argue that such solutions can only account for our pre-theoretical intuitions if supplemented ontologically, by something in the vein of (though perhaps not necessarily identical with) Whitehedian processes. I then explore the suitability of this approach to the arrow paradox, and end by exploring ontological and metaontological concerns one might raise about whether this is a viable way out of paradox.