Is Quinean naturalism dependent on the metametalanguage of metaphysics?

Pamela Ann J. Boongaling

doi:10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.4

Abstract

I will demonstrate that Quinean naturalism must accommodate a priori truths in its epistemology if it aims to retain its naturalist stance. This happens becausethe laws of first-order logic which it uses in the regimentation of scientific theories are best perceived as metaphysical principles rather than logical laws. To support this position, I will demonstrate that since our best scientific theories are dependent on the meta-language of first-order logic and since the meta-language of first-order logic is included in the metametalanguage of metaphysics, science is also dependent on the metametalanguage of metaphysics.Hence, the cogency of Quinean naturalism’s account of our best scientific theories must explain how science is dependent on the metametalanguage of metaphysics.

Highlights

Roger Gibson (2000) claims that Quinean naturalism ( QN) can be understood in terms of its three major components: naturalism, empiricism, and physicalism.1 He further claims that amongst these components, the hallmark of QN is its adherence to naturalism (Gibson, 2000)
(P3) The law of non-contradiction is a fundamental metaphysical principle from which other principles can be derived as it claims that nature is ruled by consistency (Tahko, 2009)
Año 21 No 36, enero – junio, 2020. pp. 39 - 52. This argument merits an exposition and analysis for at least three reasons. It shows that the usage of first-order logic ( FOL) as the meta-language of science cannot merely be based on its utility in the theoretical regimentation of scientific theories since its fundamental laws reflect the metaphysical principles that science must necessarily presuppose in order for it to prove its initial physicalist hypothesis regarding the external world

Summary

Resumen Abstract

I will demonstrate that Quinean naturalism must accommodate a priori truths in its epistemology if it aims to retain its naturalist stance. This happens because the laws of first-order logic which it uses in the regimentation of scientific theories are best perceived as metaphysical principles rather than logical laws. Demostraré que, dado que nuestras mejores teorías científicas dependen del metalenguaje de la lógica de primer orden, y dado que el metalenguaje de la lógica de primer orden está incluido en el metametalenguaje de la metafísica, la ciencia también depende del metametalenguaje de la metafísica. La contundencia de la explicación del naturalismo quineano de nuestras mejores teorías científicas debe explicar cómo la ciencia depende del metametalenguaje de la metafísica. Año 21 No 36, enero – junio, 2020. pp. 39 - 52 ISSN 0124-6127 (Impreso), 2462-9596 (En línea)

Introduction

Conclusion