Is public justification central to liberalism?

Abstract

Many exponents of liberalism in contemporary political theory claim that ‘public justification’ is the central idea of liberal political belief. This paper challenges this contention, first by highlighting some of the many members of the liberal ideological tradition which do not share this characteristic and, second, by arguing that Rawlsian political liberalism (which is presented as a paradigm of the public‐justificatory variant) cannot coherently sustain its own professed commitment to public justification. This points to serious structural flaws in the concept of public‐justificatory liberalism. The article ventures a partial explanation for why liberal political theorists have attempted to redefine liberalism in public‐justificatory terms, but contends that they have yet to convince that their version of the ideology (a label which they may well be inclined to resist) is a tenable and desirable substitute for those they seek to displace. Liberalism is better served by positing the public justification of its principles as one of the numerous ethical goals of the ideal state it pursues, rather than the precondition of any legitimate political action taken in its name.