Is Pickering's ”Pragmatic Realism” Viable?

Abstract

In his book The Mangle of Practice and in other writings, Andrew Pickering purports to resolve the question of scientific realism by recasting the debate in terms of his own view “pragmatic” or “performative” realism. This view is informed by a constructivist view of scientific practice. Therefore it is characterised by Pickering as a species of anti-realism that claims to take due account of the both the objective and pragmatic aspects of certain versions of scientific realism. This paper analyses Pickering's claims to have resolved the debate and examines the merits and limitations of his proposed replacement. I show that insofar as Pickering conceives scientific practice as eschewing any position concerning the correspondence of theoretical concepts with nature (either for or against), his position can be compared in several respects to Fine's much discussed alternative to realism, NOA (the Natural Ontological Attitude). I contend that Pickering's proposed “performative realism” is no more successful at resolving the scientific realism question in than is NOA.