Is pacifism irrational?

Abstract

When I tell others I disavow the use of violence in any and all its forms, I get different responses. My critics view my pacifism as essentially irrational. They can easily think of circumstances when the only rational action would be to initiate violence in self‐defense or to defend others. Allowing oneself or others to be hurt by not acting, they say, would not only be irrational but also morally decrepit. This critique, or variants of it, has come from a wide range of theorists and policy makers. A hypothetical scenario in such a refutation of pacifism might run something like this. Imagine a deranged and hostile malefactor who's intent on destroying a sizeable portion of humanity. Only you stand between the villain and the doomsday device which, if used, will destroy whole continents. The only way you can prevent the machine from being used, however, is by using violence. Surely our intuition would suggest that in this case violence would not only be permissible, but also necessary, since hurting the malefactor is a lesser evil than allowing so many innocent people die. Therefore, it is claimed, if pacifism forswears violence in all circumstances, then surely it is a misguided philosophy. With this perspective, my imagined interlocutor has gone to the heart of popular misgivings about an unconditional commitment to nonviolence: it illustrates why most people worldwide consider pacifism to be irrational.