Is only one of my selves authentic? An empirical approach

Abstract

In behavioral economics, intrapersonal conflict is predominantly interpreted hierarchically. A “present-biased” intrapersonal doer may spoil the goal of a rational planner. This often suggests paternalistic interventions that help the “true” or “authentic” self to overwhelm its present-biased alter ego. Game theorist Schelling proposed a reciprocal interpretation of intrapersonal conflict that interprets both selves as strategic players, which Elster contradicted by claiming that in any conflict only one self is capable of strategic behavior and therefore authentic. Previous empirical studies, however, cannot test this interpretation, because their design provides commitment devices unilaterally to only one self. In an experiment, we provided commitment devices to both selves and find similar inclinations to use this strategic tool. Given this, the symmetric view on intrapersonal conflict seems no less plausible than the hierarchical one. Our results might contribute to a richer debate on intrapersonal conflict by feeding in some skepticism about the self-evidence with which paternalists take sides.