Abstract
David Franz’s (2022) claim that it is not possible to give an empirically meaningful answer to the question “Are psychological attributes quantitative?” is rejected as incorrect. First, the ambiguous terminology identified by Franz in the measurement debate is not inherent to the debate itself, but reflects a biased understanding of the empirical meaning of axioms of measurement. Second, the problem of “hidden” or “unobservable” phenomena described by Franz as the root of conceptual confusion is not unique to psychology, but can also be found in physics. Therefore, it cannot be the cause for the failure to establish measurement in psychology. This comment concludes with the statement that, though both conceptual and empirical analyses are useful, Franz’s general claim that the former supersedes the latter must be rejected as inaccurate.
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