Is Martha Nussbaum really political liberal?

Abstract

This paper puts under scrutiny Martha Nussbaum's turn to liberalism. In this paper, I intend to shed light on two problems that Nussbaum must face when she try to follow Rawls' idea of liberalism. First of all, I would like to show the limits of application of the technique of overlapping consensus. I try to argue that Nussbaum fails to prove that we can attain a universal list of values (such as a list of primary goods) through an overlapping consensus. By contrast she cannot avoid Rawls' limitation of overlapping consensus to communities already ruled by liberal institutions. Secondly, I question Nussbaum's political liberal attitude when she faces difficult issues such as non-discrimination inside religious institutions. I try to show that in this case Nussbaum's arguments are weak because they are based on a clear-cut distinction between public and private realms. Yet, such a clear-cut distinction is practically impossible in liberal communities. We cannot but argue about the boundaries between public spheres and private domains.