Is it wise to protect false targets?

Abstract

The paper considers a system consisting of genuine elements and false targets that cannot be distinguished by the attacker's observation. The false targets can be destroyed with much less effort than the genuine elements. We show that even when an attacker cannot distinguish between the genuine elements and the false targets, in many cases it can enhance the attack efficiency using a double attack strategy in which it tries first to eliminate with minimal effort as many false targets as possible in the first attack and then distributes its entire remaining resource among all surviving targets in the second attack. The model for evaluating the system vulnerability in the double attack is suggested for a single genuine element, and multiple genuine elements configured in parallel or in series. This model assumes that in both attacks the attacking resource is distributed evenly among the attacked targets. The defender can optimize its limited resource distribution between deploying more false targets and protecting them better. The attacker can optimize its limited resource distribution between two attacks. The defense strategy is analyzed based on a two period minmax game. A numerical procedure is suggested that allows the defender to find the optimal resource distribution between deploying and protecting the false targets. The methodology of optimal attack and defense strategies analysis is demonstrated. It is shown that protecting the false targets may reduce the efficiency of the double attack strategy and make this strategy ineffective in situations with low contest intensity and few false targets.