Is it time to destroy the smallpox virus?

Abstract

![Figure][1] PHOTO: DR. FRED MURPHY/CDC The last cases of smallpox occurred more than 37 years ago. Should we now destroy the variola virus samples that remain in the two World Health Organization (WHO)–designated smallpox laboratories, located in the United States (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) and Russia (Koltsobo, Siberia)? In May, the 67th World Health Assembly in Geneva decided that the previously agreed-upon decision to destroy the smallpox virus stocks would, once again, be postponed for an additional 3 years until the 70th World Health Assembly in 2017. We support the decision not to destroy the virus. Although true eradication and protection from bioterrorist small-pox attacks will only be assured once the causative agent is eliminated from all laboratories, there is no way to guarantee that all stocks have been destroyed. During the last search for residual variola, all nations collaborated and responded to a special WHO letter addressed to the heads of health service of each country. Sixteen smallpox isolates were reported ([ 1 ][2]). Given these results, more stocks likely exist in unknown places. The recent discovery of variola in old specimens at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Bethesda, Maryland, highlights this risk ([ 2 ][3]–[ 4 ][4]). Furthermore, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the former USSR biowarfare laboratory produced huge amounts of variola virus. Much like the recent NIH situation, it would not be surprising to find that, in some dark corner of this or a similar facility, viable tubes of variola virus were still resting comfortably. The destruction of official government stocks could serve to increase, rather than decrease, risk in the event that adversarial groups gain access to the virus. Moreover, synthesis of smallpox virus could be accomplished by a well-trained laboratory technician. Lack of access to the original strain could also impede research should a new strain emerge. Given the likely continuing need to have viable variola virus to conduct required research, the security and the political threats in today's world, and historical efforts to use variola as a biologic weapon, we support the establishment of a secure system to maintain live smallpox virus under the supervision of the United Nations. We recommend that the WHO establish a special commission to implement this system. 1. [↵][5] 1. D. A. Henderson, 2. I. Arita , Biosecur. Bioterror. 12, 117 (2014). [OpenUrl][6][CrossRef][7][PubMed][8] 2. [↵][9] CDC Media Statement on Newly Discovered Smallpox Specimens (2014); [www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/s0708-nih.html][10]. 3. 1. S. Reardon , Sci. Am. (2014); [www.scientificamerican.com/article/vials-of-smallpox-virus-found-unsecured-at-nih/][11]. 4. [↵][12] 1. J. Kaiser , Science Insider (2014); . [1]: pending:yes [2]: #ref-1 [3]: #ref-2 [4]: #ref-4 [5]: #xref-ref-1-1 View reference 1 in text [6]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DBiosecur.%2BBioterror.%26rft.volume%253D12%26rft.spage%253D117%26rft_id%253Dinfo%253Adoi%252F10.1089%252Fbsp.2014.1509.comm%26rft_id%253Dinfo%253Apmid%252F24712454%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [7]: /lookup/external-ref?access_num=10.1089/bsp.2014.1509.comm&link_type=DOI [8]: /lookup/external-ref?access_num=24712454&link_type=MED&atom=%2Fsci%2F345%2F6200%2F1010.1.atom [9]: #xref-ref-2-1 View reference 2 in text [10]: http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/s0708-nih.html [11]: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/vials-of-smallpox-virus-found-unsecured-at-nih/ [12]: #xref-ref-4-1 View reference 4 in text