Abstract
People are more likely to judge repeatedly perceived statements as true. A decisive explanation for this so-called truth effect is that the repeated information can be processed more fluently than new information and that this fluency experience renders the information more familiar and trustworthy. Little is known, however, regarding whether and how affective states and dispositional cognitive preferences influence the truth effect. To this end, we conducted two experiments in which we manipulated (a) processing fluency via repetition, (b) the time interval (10 min vs. 1 week) between repetitions, and (c) short-term affective states using the presentation of emotional faces (Experiment 1) or the presence of an irrelevant source for changes in affective states (Experiment 2). Additionally, we assessed the dispositional variables need for cognitive closure (NCC), preference for deliberation (PD) and preference for intuition (PI). Results of Experiment 1 showed that the truth effect was significantly reduced for statements that were followed by a negative prime, although this was the case only for the longer repetition lag. Furthermore, higher NCC and lower PD scores were associated with an increased truth effect. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the moderating role of NCC and further showed that participants, who were provided with an alternative source for changes in their affective states, showed a reduced truth effect. Together, the findings suggest that (a) fluency-related changes in affective states may be (co-)responsible for the truth effect, (b) the truth effect is decreased when the repetition interval is long rather than short, and (c) the truth effect is increased for individuals with a higher need for cognitive closure. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.
Highlights
We receive large amounts of information every day
The condition with neutral affective primes served as reference condition and the two dummycoded variables were termed positive valence and negative valence. This coding was used because it allowed testing our hypotheses in the most efficient manner; especially, the higher probability to judge a statement as true when it is repeated instead of new, the influence of positive affect on truth judgments for new statements, as well as the impact of negative affect and different dispositional variables (NCC, preference for intuition (PI), & preference for deliberation (PD)) on the truth effect
The findings show that the truth effect was reduced by negative affective primes, as well as that the effect of repetition was increased by need for cognitive closure, and decreased by preference for deliberation, after the ten-minute interval
Summary
We receive large amounts of information every day. Digitalization and the growing use of new channels, such as social networks, are steadily increasing the number of daily information. As currently publically discussed under the catch phrase “fake news”, not all provided information is true. We need to evaluate the quality of information, that is, we need to decide, whether the perceived information is trustworthy. It has been argued that people often deploy simple heuristics when they make judgments under uncertainty (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and this may apply to truth judgments. It has been shown that familiarity with given information is used as a cue for judging its truthfulness: Familiar information is more likely to be considered
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
