Is interpolation cognitively encapsulated? Measuring the effects of belief on Kanizsa shape discrimination and illusory contour formation

Abstract

Contour interpolation is a perceptual process that fills-in missing edges on the basis of how surrounding edges (inducers) are spatiotemporally related. Cognitive encapsulation refers to the degree to which perceptual mechanisms act in isolation from beliefs, expectations, and utilities (Pylyshyn, 1999). Is interpolation encapsulated from belief? We addressed this question by having subjects discriminate briefly-presented, partially-visible fat and thin shapes, the edges of which either induced or did not induce illusory contours (relatable and non-relatable conditions, respectively). Half the trials in each condition incorporated task-irrelevant distractor lines, known to disrupt the filling-in of contours. Half of the observers were told that the visible parts of the shape belonged to a single thing (group strategy); the other half were told that the visible parts were disconnected (ungroup strategy). It was found that distractor lines strongly impaired performance in the relatable condition, but minimally in the non-relatable condition; that strategy did not alter the effects of the distractor lines for either the relatable or non-relatable stimuli; and that cognitively grouping relatable fragments improved performance whereas cognitively grouping non-relatable fragments did not. These results suggest that (1) filling-in effects during illusory contour formation cannot be easily removed via strategy; (2) filling-in effects cannot be easily manufactured from stimuli that fail to elicit interpolation; and (3) actively grouping fragments can readily improve discrimination performance, but only when those fragments form interpolated contours. Taken together, these findings indicate that discriminating filled-in shapes depends on strategy but the filling-in process itself may be encapsulated from belief.