Is iFood Starving the Market? Antitrust Enforcement in the Market for Online Food Delivery in Brazil

Abstract

This article examines the decisions taken by the Brazilian Competition Authority, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) in two antitrust cases related the dominant food delivery platform iFood, one merger review and one investigation into exclusive dealing agreements. Through an in-depth examination of the case documents, this article uncovers the evolution in CADE’s comprehension of the competition dynamics in multi-sided digital markets, while also revealing gaps and inadequacies in the authority’s substantive and procedural antitrust enforcement. Based on the findings, the article draws lessons that can help strengthen the authority’s approach to digital platform cases in the future. Firstly, CADE must adapt its steps of analysis and develop new theories of harms that are better tailored to the characteristics of multi-sided platforms. Secondly, CADE should conduct more rigorous merger reviews that take into account the wider impact of dominant platforms’ business strategies on the ecosystem of players orbiting them. Thirdly, the article highlights the importance of the authority building its capacities and expertise to detect competition problems from an early stage, design effective remedies, and ensure these remedies are enforced effectively. These recommendations underscore the significance of continuously updating the enforcement framework and enhancing the capabilities of the competition authority to keep pace with the rapidly evolving digital economy. digital markets, competition law, antitrust, exclusivity dealing, merger review, theories of harm, online food delivery, Brazil