Is hybrid formal theory of arguments, stories and criminal evidence well suited for negative causation?

Abstract

In this paper, I have two primary goals. First, I show that the causal-based story approach in A hybrid formal theory of arguments, stories and criminal evidence (or Hybrid Theory, for short) is ill suited to negative (or absence) causation. In the literature, the causal-based approach requires that hypothetical stories be causally linked to the explanandum. Many take these links to denote physical or psychological causation, or temporal precedence. However, understanding causality in those terms, as I will show, cannot capture cases of negative causation, which are of interest to the Law. In keeping with this, I also discuss some of the difficulties Hybrid Theory invites by remaining silent on the nature of the causal links. In my second aim, I sketch a way for Hybrid Theory to overcome this problem. By replacing the original, underlying causal structure with contrastive causation in the law, Hybrid Theory can represent reasoning in which the evidence that is appealed to is causally linked via negative causation to the explananda.