Is hurting people wrong?

Abstract

Abstract This article considers the balance drawn in the criminal law between freedom and coercion, with particular reference to injuries inflicted consensually in the course of sexual activities. The position is taken that society is entitled to restrict the occasions upon which injury is inflicted upon others, even if there is consent to such injury. It should not be considered a presumptuous interference with the autonomy of individuals that society seeks to protect one of its fundamental moral building blocks, namely the social taboo against the infliction of injury upon another. If the infliction of injury is allowable simply by being consented to, it would be the fact of consent, rather than moral conviction, which polices the barrier between a society where sadism is considered normal and the kind of society most of us would like to inhapit. This is a dangerous path to tread. On the other hand, since the moral autonomy of individuals is at stake, it is necessary to ensure that the balance between freedom and control is drawn in a coherent, non-discriminatory fashion. The recent case of Brown, at present awaiting consideration by the House of Lords, provides an opportunity for the principles governing the enforcement of morals in a morally differentiated society to be expounded.