Is human enhancement intrinsically bad?

Karolina Kudlek

doi:10.1007/s11019-021-10003-w

Abstract

A pertinent concern in the human enhancement debate is that human enhancement technologies (HET) are intrinsically bad and, hence, morally impermissible. This article evaluates the related claims about the intrinsic badness of HET by looking into philosophical theories of intrinsic value. It investigates how well-established conceptions of intrinsic value map onto typical bioconservative arguments about HET's intrinsic badness. Three predominant variants of these arguments are explored and found wanting: (i) HET are intrinsically bad owing to their unnaturalness; (ii) the pursuit of HET reveals intrinsically bad character (“the desire for mastery”); and (iii) HET will necessarily undermine intrinsically valuable things (e.g., human dignity). My analysis shows that the debate on intrinsic value places serious constraints on claims about the intrinsic badness of HET. More specifically, the analysis shows that bioconservative arguments are, for the most part, inconsistent, misconceived, and overly speculative. Enhancement interventions cannot be bearers of intrinsic value on any of its plausible understandings, and, even if we could grant such a possibility, there are no compelling reasons to presume that the intrinsic value of HET would be necessarily negative. As a result, claims regarding their moral impermissibility are unwarranted.

Highlights

Some authors in the human enhancement debate hold that human enhancement technologies (HET) are intrinsically bad and morally impermissible
My primary aim was to show that notions of intrinsic value place serious constraints on claims about the intrinsic badness of HET
I argued that enhancement interventions are not typical bearers of intrinsic value on any of its plausible understandings

Summary

Introduction

Some authors in the human enhancement debate hold that human enhancement technologies (HET) are intrinsically bad and morally impermissible. For example, prominent bioconservatives typically claim that we might agree about improvements, safety, the fairness of distribution etc., and still be morally hesitant about the permissibility of HET (Fukuyama 2002; Kass 2003; Sandel 2004). It does not necessarily follow that HET have negative intrinsic value in virtue of their intrinsic properties, such as unnaturalness This is because it is conceptually mistaken to equate the unnatural and the bad, as well as inconsistent with common practice to object to biomedical means based solely upon their artificiality. We have examined the possibility of different intrinsic (unnaturalness; bad character) and nonintrinsic (disrupting the natural; desire for mastery) properties grounding the negative intrinsic value of HET. 32 Other examples of intrinsically valuable things threatened by enhancements include humility, spontaneity, the mystery of life, openness to the unbidden, human flourishing, etc Hauskeller explains this concern in greater detail by claiming that attempts to make better people seem to be detrimental to humility, a virtue that Sandel highly values. If we endorse this line of reasoning, future research should consider contingent instead of intrinsic factors. My examination has hopefully cleared the way for a more fruitful discussion focused on the evaluation of the contingent rather than the intrinsic value of HET

Conclusion

Compliance with ethical standards