Is Goodness a Homeostatic Property Cluster?

Abstract

In “How to Be a Moral Realist,” Richard Boyd proposes that moral properties such as moral goodness have the same metaphysical structure as properties that define natural kinds. In particular, he proposes that moral goodness is constituted by a “homeostatic property cluster” (HPC). This hypothesis plays a key role in Boyd’s defense of naturalistic moral realism. He contends that, if moral goodness were an HPC, then there would be independent justification for thinking that the term ‘moral goodness’ possesses an a posteriori real definition. This latter claim is then used to rebut several influential arguments advanced by moral antirealists and ethical nonnaturalists. Although “How to Be a Moral Realist” is among the most widely cited defenses of contemporary naturalistic moral realism, Boyd’s proposal that moral goodness is an HPC has received very little attention. This article is an attempt to rectify this situation. I argue here that Boyd’s hypothesis is false: moral goodness is not an HPC. In Section II, I present Boyd’s account of HPC kinds. In Section III, I present his proposal that moral goodness is constituted by an HPC (and thus demarcates an HPC kind). In Section IV, I advance two arguments against this proposal. The first is a moral argument. The second points to suspicious structural features of the moral good that are not shared by paradigmatic HPC