Abstract
Research on the bi-directional relationship between political regimes and economic development has increased tremendously since Lipset’s (1959) seminal examination of the implications of economic development on political regimes. While some scholars oppose modernizationists who tie the prospects for democracy to economic growth, significant bodies of literature have argued that since democracies consistently outperform autocracies in growth and development indexes, democracy rather is a sine qua non for development. Others also highlight the counterproductive effect of democratic politics and judge it to be present-bias and unrepresentative of future interest. This article relooks at the conversation of whether the pursuit of long-term development policies is feasible under democracies, with an empirical focus on Ghana. Aside from its enviable democracy track record, Ghana is touted as the first country in the developing world to roll out a development plan. Using long term planning as a proxy for transformative development, I investigate how elected political elites in Ghana respond to the dilemma of choosing between winning the next election by pursuing voter-pleasing short-term policy goals, and embarking on long-term structural transformation with short-term electoral disadvantages. I argue that competitive elections and associational liberties affect the pursuit of long-term policy planning in Ghana. The incentive to implement or abandon long term plans is shaped by the rational calculations of the country’s political elites in response to the short-term preferences of electorates. Keywords : Democracy, Development planning, Present-bias, Elections, Associational liberties, Ghana DOI: 10.7176/DCS/12-2-01 Publication date: February 28 th 2022
Highlights
Debate on the implications of political regimes on economic development continues to dominate both theoretical and applied research in comparative politics
Democracy is said to be anti-developmental since democratic political elites are often short-term planners, myopic and “systematically biased in favour of the present” (Thompson, 2005:246) – a character not often associated with economic transformation
Impressions have been created that a democratic political architecture is not supportive of long-term planning and economic transformation, and that in order to enjoy democracy, people have to wait until the institutionalization of material progress (Lipset 1959; Johnson 1982)
Summary
Debate on the implications of political regimes on economic development continues to dominate both theoretical and applied research in comparative politics. Clear is that Ghana’s movement to sustainable growth and development with focus on manufacturing, wealth generation and employment creation may depend solely not on the usual macroeconomic stability management, heavy reliance on natural resources, Official Development Assistance (ODA) or the export of oil and agricultural commodities but rather on the pursuit of policies that fundamentally transform the structure of the economy Both on the theoretical and policy fronts, there is a wide recognition that the country should consider restructuring the industrial and allied sectors while at the same time supporting the development of appropriate manufacturing technologies (Kwakye, 2012). I would be concentrating on two tenets of the maximalist democracy, namely competitive elections and associational liberties for my analysis
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