Abstract
This paper addresses the topic of terrorism insurance. Financial markets and international institutions believe that terrorism risk modelling falls short of making the likelihood of future attacks more predictable and quantifiable. We present the literature of research in the domain of game theory applied to terrorism insurance, we scrutinise the possibility of using evolutionary game theory and we put forward the theoretical and practical issues that need to be addressed before reaching a satisfactory modelling framework to be used by the sector.
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More From: International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management
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