Abstract
In this paper we are attempting in the context of recent developments in cognitive science to examine the viability of the Libet solution to the problem of the freedom of the will. We will be showing that this solution is still possible if refraining acts can be considered not only as different kinds of actions from performing acts, but also peculiar actions that have causal consequences without having a result component. It requires a very strong commitment to an odd model of action, which makes more plausible the Wegner idea that freedom of the will is to be explained away as an illusion, albeit an illusion that is helpful in establishing the authorship of actions.
Highlights
In this paper we are attempting in the context of recent developments in cognitive science to examine the viability of the Libet solution to the problem of the freedom of the will
We will be showing that this solution is still possible if refraining acts can be considered as different kinds of actions from performing acts, and peculiar actions that have causal consequences without having a result component
Research which is freely available for redistribution
Summary
In this paper we are attempting in the context of recent developments in cognitive science to examine the viability of the Libet solution to the problem of the freedom of the will. Is freedom of the will neutrally possible?
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