Is Freedom an Existential Category in Ancient Discourse?

Abstract

Abstract In much of the Christian exegetical tradition, freedom, ἐλευθερία, is considered an existential state. Hans Dieter Betz, for instance, assessed freedom as the “central theological concept which sums up the Christian’s situation before God as well as in this world” (1979: 255). Yet in his 2001 monograph, Constructing Autocracy, the classicist Matthew Roller explains that ancient authors only employed the terms libertas (“freedom”) and its complementary term servitus (“slavery”) together as metaphors to characterize another situation. Unless they were defining what it meant to be a free person or a slave (e.g., Dio Chrysostom, Or. 14, 15), ancient authors did not employ the terms “freedom” or “slavery” to designate a political or religious state of being. When employed paradigmatically, as commentary on another situation, the terms “freedom” and “slavery” carried important social and ethical implications. This article applies Roller’s insights to Paul’s use of freedom in Galatians.