Abstract
Abstract The objective of the chapter is to understand how free movement was ‘constructed’ as an exceptional form of mobility, which has very little in common with ordinary regimes of migration, and then to address the exception hypothesis. It asks simple, yet provocative, questions: Is free movement (still) as exceptional as it is claimed to be? Is not free movement an ordinary type of migration after all? The chapter first analyses how the divide between free movement and migration in EU law was constructed, on both conceptual and practical levels. Then it questions the ‘exceptionalism’ of EU free movement law: free movement and migration are intertwined realities that are connected at structural and conceptual levels. Absent the logic of evolution and progression, which underpinned the EU institutional approach to free movement law, what in fact separates free movement and migration in EU law could well be a difference in intensity rather than in substance.
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