Is “Education” a Thick Epistemic Concept?

Abstract

Is “education” a thick epistemic concept? The answer depends on the viability of the “thick/thin” distinction, as well as the degree to which education is an epistemic concept at all. I concentrate mainly on the latter, and argue that epistemological matters are central to education and our philosophical thinking about it. Insofar, education is indeed rightly thought of as an epistemic concept. In laying out education’s epistemological dimensions, I hope to clarify the degree to which it makes sense to regard the concept as “thick.” I also discuss the relationship between philosophy of education and virtue epistemology, as well as the sense in which being educated might itself be thought to be an epistemic virtue. Finally, I urge virtue epistemologists in particular, and epistemologists generally, to turn their attention to questions of education, to further both the philosophy of education and epistemology itself.