Is designing mysterious? challenging the dual knowledge thesis

Abstract

The hermeneutical philosophy of Gadamer and Heidegger and the pragmatism of Dewey are brought to bear in arguing against the view that designing involves a special kind of knowledge that is fundamentally difficult to grasp and therefore mysterious. The hermeneutical thesis maintains that understanding is acquired in a manner best described in terms of bringing expectations to bear on a situation. These expectations are derived from our effective historical consciousness and are constantly being renewed as we respond to situations. This mode of thinking is the only way of thinking, whether we are solving a mathematical problem or creating a work of art. Not withstanding this ‘common sense’ understanding, claims for the mystery of designing persist. These claims are examined in turn in the light of a hermeneutical understanding of thought. They include the dual knowledge thesis, the more fundamental notion of the thinking subject isolated from the world of objects, and the subjectivism of the Romantic movement that is evident in writings about the genius loci. There is then a consideration of the sense in which it is appropriate to talk about designing as being different to other activities and how this impinges on design teaching and practice. The argument is presented that when mystery is removed then effective dialogue, and hence learning, can ensue.