Is Deception a Consequence of Emotion? Disposition, Mood, and Decision Frame.

Abstract

Deception often implicates cognitive resources, and emotions have rarely been used to account for deception. Deception is examined using a two-person cheap talk game (N= 219) in three payoff groups (participant and partner payoff difference: none, small, large) where each participant has to make two deception choices and two dictator control choices presented in two decision frames (Gain Deception, Loss Deception, Gain Control, and Loss Control). Measures of emotion (i.e., dispositional reward-punishment sensitivity and affect mood) were used to account for the four choices. The results showed that unfair gain-sharing in the dictator control was frame-independent. Emotions accounted for loss frame choices in the payoff group that inflicted the largest partner loss. Interaction of reward and punishment sensitivity increased partner-deception in a loss frame, whereas the interaction reduced selfish choice in the dictator control, with negative mood and reward sensitivity as a deterrent of selfish choice in loss control. Thus, we find that including emotions to account for deception might improve our understanding of deception, especially in developing countries.