Abstract

Theoretical studies of cooperative behavior have focused on decision strategies, such as tit-for-tat, that depend on remembering a partner's last choices. Yet, an empirical study by Stevens, Volstorf, Schooler, and Rieskamp (2011) demonstrated that human memory may not meet the requirements needed to use these strategies. When asked to recall the previous behavior of simulated partners in a cooperative memory task, participants performed poorly, making errors in 10–24% of the trials. However, we do not know the extent to which this task taps specialized cognition for cooperation. It may be possible to engage participants in more cooperative, strategic thinking, which may improve memory. On the other hand, compared to other situations, a cooperative context may already engage improved memory via cheater detection mechanisms. The current study investigated the specificity of memory in cooperative contexts by varying (1) the costs of errors in memory by making forgetting defection more costly and (2) whether the recall situation is framed as a cooperative or neutral context. Also, we investigated whether variation in participants' social network size could account for individual differences observed in memory accuracy. We found that neither including differential costs for misremembering defection nor removing the cooperative context influenced memory accuracy for cooperation. Combined, these results suggest that memory accuracy is robust to differences in the cooperative context: Adding more strategic components does not help accuracy and removing cooperative components does not hurt accuracy. Social network size, however, did correlate with memory accuracy: People with larger networks remembered events better. These findings suggest that cooperative memory does not seem to be special compared to other forms of memory, which aligns with previous work demonstrating the domain generality of memory. However, the demands of interacting in a large social network may require excellent memory. Thus, modeling the evolution of cooperation requires an understanding of both the social environment in which agents interact, as well as the cognitive capabilities of these agents.

Highlights

  • Upon entering a bar or restaurant in your home town, you might recognize a friend and purchase a drink for him or her

  • Experiment 2 was a replication study in which we focused on cooperative memory and social network size

  • Our aims in this study were to (1) replicate findings of Stevens et al (2011), (2) determine whether more strategic payoff situations induce better memory than standard payoffs, (3) determine whether cooperative contexts induce better memory than neutral contexts, and (4) assess whether memory accuracy positively correlates with number of social contacts

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Summary

Introduction

Upon entering a bar or restaurant in your home town, you might recognize a friend and purchase a drink for him or her. When on a layover in an airport far from home, you likely would not join with a stranger and buy a drink for him or her. Why pay a cost to help a friend but not a stranger? You would likely not continue to cooperate if your friend always expected you to pay for his or her drink. A population of cooperators would not resist invasion from defectors. It can be conditional on relatedness to your partner (kin selection: Hamilton, 1964), costs imposed on defection (punishment: Boyd and Richerson, 1992), observations from other potential partners (reputation/indirect reciprocity: Boyd and Richerson, 1989), or rates of group fission and extinction (group selection: Traulsen and Nowak, 2006)

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