Is Climate Change Morally Good from Non-Anthropocentric Perspectives?

Abstract

ABSTRACTAnthropogenic climate change poses some difficult ethical quandaries for non-anthropocentrists. While it is hard to deny that climate change is a substantial moral ill for humans, many non-human organisms and ecosystems stand to benefit from plausible climate change scenarios. Modelling studies provide evidence that net primary productivity (NPP) could be substantially boosted, both regionally and globally, as a result of warming from increased concentrations of greenhouse gases. The same holds for deployment of certain types of climate engineering. This has a surprising implication: from certain non-anthropocentric perspectives, some plausible scenarios of climate change and climate engineering might bring about morally better states of affairs when compared to both pre-industrial and emission-mitigation baselines. We present existing evidence that certain emissions trajectories and climate engineering scenarios are likely to benefit non-human organisms on the whole, using NPP as a proxy for non-human flourishing. We then argue that, on a non-anthropocentric perspective that affords independent moral value to non-human organisms or systems, there is reason to deem such emissions trajectories and climate engineering scenarios to be morally better than prominent alternatives, including aggressive mitigation. If we are to take non-anthropocentrism seriously, then we should view current discussions of the ethics of climate change and climate engineering as incomplete, for they pay little attention to the well-being of non-human organisms in their own right. However, giving non-anthropocentric perspectives a more prominent place might substantially alter how we view climate ethics, as it would challenge the widely held views that climate change and climate engineering constitute absolute moral ills.