Is anyone a cognitive ethologist?

Abstract

We have heard a lot over the past two days about topics such as language, tool use, morality,conflict resolution, and culture in nonhuman animals. We’ve been instructed on how to studyanimal minds, and how to avoid being guilty of the wrong kinds of anthropomorphism. In brief,we’ve seen the results of a sea change in attitudes towards thinking of animals as cognitivelycomplex individuals whose mental capacities and biological heritage are continuous with those ofhumans.Many philosophers are interested in these developments, and the term “cognitiveethology” has become familiar to them. But philosophers’ use of this term shows little respect fortraditional differences among different approaches to the scientific study of animal minds. Overthe past couple of years, I’ve encountered an increasing number of philosophers using “cognitiveethology” to refer to the study of animal cognition generally. (See, e.g., Kornblith 2002, p. 28, fn.1.) Perhaps this is as it should be, for part of the sea change that I just mentioned is anincreasing willingness of scientists trained in a variety of theoretical perspectives to take seriouslyquestions about animal minds (see, e.g., the diverse contributions to Bekoff et al., 2002). It mightalso be argued that the old distinctions between animal learning theory, comparative psychologyand ethology are increasingly irrelevant to modern animal behavior scientists whose interests inanimal cognition may lead them to combine approaches from different historical traditions (e.g.,Balda et al. 1998; Shettleworth 2001). Why not call all of this activity cognitive ethology? But ifeveryone’s a cognitive ethologist, then in a sense no one is, for the term would mark no distinctionin the study of animal cognition.Despite the willingness of philosophers to apply “cognitive ethology” generically toscientific studies of animal cognition, many of the scientists actually doing the work are reluctantto accept the label. One common reason for this is displayed by Alan Kamil in his essay “On theproper definition of cognitive ethology” (Kamil 1998). Kamil laments the association of the termwith apparently anecdotal approaches to allegedly intractable problems. The principal target ofsuch complaints is Donald Griffin, who originated the term “cognitive ethology” approximately 25years ago. In a series of books he has urged scientists to consider questions of conscious awarenessin animals. Resistance to Griffin’s call has deep causes in the history of studies of the animal1