Is a Political Science of Human Rights Possible?

Abstract

The political science of human rights rests on a philosophical contradiction. The contemporary conception of human rights derives from the ‘classical’ conception of natural rights, which was based on the philosophy of natural law. Modern social science derives from nineteenth-century positivism, which arose precisely to refute the philosophy of natural tow, and to exclude the concept of natural rights from scientific discourse. The concept of human rights retains from its natural-law heritage its inherent prescriptive character, but it is, for that reason, not a proper object of scientific study by the canons of positivism. I show how this philosophical confusion affects the contemporary political science of human rights. I argue that the political science of human rights should be interdisciplinary between philosophy and social science, between the social sciences, and between political science and international relations. Law should be removed from its hegemonic role in human-rights studies, and relocated correctly within this interdisciplinary approach.