Irreversibility in Nuclear Arms Control: Lessons from the US-Soviet/Russian Arms Control Process

Abstract

ABSTRACT The United States and Soviet Union/Russian Federation signed several arms control treaties that mandated reductions in their numbers of deployed nuclear weapons. These treaties outlined complex technical procedures that governed the process of eliminating weapons in excess of allowed numbers. The procedures often required the physical destruction of missiles and launchers, thus making it difficult for the parties to reverse the elimination of these weapons while the treaties remained in force. These complex procedures also helped the parties verify compliance, as both the elimination process and the reduction in numbers were required. However, most of the treaties allowed the parties to produce and deploy new weapons while the treaty was in force, as long as the numbers remained within the treaty limits. Moreover, the parties could add to their forces and reverse their reductions after the treaties lapsed. Thus, even if the treaty required irreversible procedures to implement the mandated reductions, the outcome would not necessarily remain irreversible forever. Both parties could restore capabilities if their security assessments changed. Thus, a political commitment to restrain nuclear programs may be more important in ensuring the long-term irreversibility of disarmament than the legal obligations and technical procedures codified in arms control agreements.