Abstract
This article examines whether Independent Regulatory Commissions (IRCs) received less budgetary support than executive branch Dependent Regulatory Agencies (DRAs) between the late 1970s and 2000. It also examines whether there were political differences in spending priorities between social and economic regulation. The principal‐agent theory was used to explain why IRCs do not fare as well compared to DRAs in terms of budgetary support. The findings indicate that IRCs received less funding than DRAs in the social regulation field, supporting the principal‐agent model of budgetary decision making. Political impacts were prevalent in all areas of regulation spending.
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