Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990

Abstract

The driving force behind Saddam Husayn's decisions go war in 1980 and 1990 was his belief that foreign forces were working destabilize the Ba `th Party regime in Iraq. Saddam believed that Iraq had a good chance of winning those wars. However, the circumstances that encouraged that belief were not new or unique the time in which those decisions were made. What changed in the period before those war decisions was Saddam's perception of foreign meddling against him in Iraq itself. On July 17, 1997, in a speech celebrating the twenty-ninth anniversary of the establishment of the Bath party regime in Iraq, President Saddam Husayn drew an extensive parallel the behavior of Iraq's two most recent military opponents - the United States and Iran. There is no difference, he said, between American behavior and Iranian behavior. In the end, the Iranians had acknowledge their defeat and end their hostilities with Iraq, and, Saddam concluded, the Americans would shortly be forced do the same.1 How could any leader claim victory in these two wars, one a terribly costly draw and the other a decisive defeat? One could simply write off Saddam's comments as self-delusion or big lie propaganda. However, this speech, whose content is consistent with Iraqi public statements since well before the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, should be seen as a window onto the real motivations behind both the invasion of Kuwait and the attack on Iran. Later on in the speech, Saddam referred the United States' failure to conquer the will of the Iraqis and the glories of Iraq, the true companions and family of Saddam Husayn. He also said that the Iranians used the rationale of saving Iraqi Shi`is from his rule - that is, bringing down his government - as a pretext continue the war against Iraq. But, he reminded both the Iranians and his listeners, am here, and I am speaking about history recall its lessons and expose similar foreign deceits against our country.2 Both wars were victories because the regime of Saddam Husayn remained in power. This article develops the thesis that Iraq's decisions go war in 1980 and 1990 are best explained by Saddam Husayn's perception that his regime was under serious and concerted pressure from a combination of international and domestic actors and circumstances. Failure change the trajectory of events would mean a much higher probability that his own rule in Iraq would not survive.3 Facing the likelihood that doing nothing would mean a decline in his regime's fortunes, he chose in both cases the risky option of international war break out of the box he perceived be forming around him.4 Locating the cause of wars within the domestic political system of the initiator has a long, if somewhat checkered, history. In his review of the literature on the topic, Jack Levy points out that statistical studies of the relationship domestic politics and war initiation show very little correlation the two, while case study and historical accounts of particular war decisions frequently emphasize domestic causes. He convincingly argues that, in large measure, this discrepancy arises from the lack of specification of just exactly how domestic politics leads war decisions.5 My argument about the link domestic regime security and war initiation in Iraqi decision-making starts from the assumption that the first goal of any leader is stay in power. In most of the World, where leaders' hold on power is not buttressed by popular election or strong traditions of constitutional order, that goal becomes even more central. The importance of regime stability considerations in the foreign policy decisions of Third World states is a central insight of much of the recent scholarship on Third World foreign policy.6 I do not argue, however, that the Iraqi decisions of 1980 and 1990 were directed at improving the standing of the regime among the Iraqi public in general or important interest groups within the Iraqi political system. …