Abstract
Democracies have two basic choices for managing ethnic, national, and religious diversity. They may seek to construct a single all-embracing public identity through “ integration ” or try to accommodate dual or multiple public identities through “ consociation. ” These are the two dominant, broad-based prescriptions that are offered for addressing the confl ict in Iraq. In this article, we argue that Iraq’s new Constitution, ratifi ed in 2005, refl ects a “ liberal ” form of consociation that accommodates Iraq’s democratically mobilized communities. We examine in detail the Constitution’s provisions for both self-government and for shared government, and argue that these provisions represent a reasonable way forward for all of Iraq’s citizens and peoples. The Constitution is defended against integrationist criticisms.
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