Iraq - A Proposal for a Strategy of Compellence

Abstract

Abstract : Since the Carter Doctrine of the 1970s, US national interests in the Persian Gulf have been termed vital, (which means the US is willing to use force to protect them), due to concerns about oil supplies, regional stability, Israeli survival, and an Arab-Israeli settlement. Thus, the US went to war in 1991 in response to Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. After defeat, Iraq accepted United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 as the cease fire ending the Gulf War. Since then, the US has practiced a strategy of containment to forestall Iraqi aggression. The Clinton Administration's 1997 A National Security Strategy for a New Century stated the US would like to see Iraq's reintegration into the international community [but] Iraq must comply with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions [and] until that behavior changes, [the US] goal is containing [emphasis added] the threat Saddam Hussein poses to Iraq's neighbors, its people, the free flow of Gulf and broader US interests in the middle east. This paper contends that the containment policy is failing, the stated political goals are not being met, and an analysis of the situation indicates the need for a strategy of compellence. The analysis answers a number of questions that address the means that are being used to meet the US political goals and how they are failing, what means are available to support a compellence strategy, and the ability of military force to meet the political goals if non-military means fail.