Iraq: A Fork in the Road for a Special Relationship?

Abstract

In his September 2003 address to the United Nations general assembly, Secretary General Kofi Annan warned the UN charter's legal and institutional framework on the use of military force among states had come to a fork the road.1 He asked a high-level panel on threats, challenges and to consider practical options for reform. Quite clearly, the secretary general's initiative was a response to the combination of the United States's rhetoric of preventive war, its assertion the UN was risking irrelevance security matters, and the invasion of March 2003. It thus seems obvious where the United States stands the debate Annan launched on it is possible to continue on the basis agreed upon, or whether radical changes are needed. It may seem equally clear Canada's answer is the world must maintain the existing multilateral framework. In other words, it may seem Canada and the United States are now headed down diverging legal and policy roads, with potentially serious implications for their special relationship. Indeed, it is tempting to see the fact Canada chose not to support the US-led intervention and the American displeasure with decision as indicative of what is to come.In this essay, we examine these assumptions and look more closely at where the two countries are headed on matters of the use of force and international We suggest it is important to separate the policy decisions and legal arguments made specifically relation to the intervention from broader policy themes. There are significant differences between American and Canadian policies on the use of force framework, but they cannot be reduced to simple unilateral vs. multilateral, or radical change vs. status quo, formulas. More importantly, differences notwithstanding, there are also opportunities for engaging the United States the renewal of the global security regime.THE IRAQ INTERVENTIONIn September 2002, the US government published a new national security strategy (NSS) appeared to challenge the existing UN framework on the use of force. A central tenet of the strategy was the confluence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), global terrorist networks, and rogue states requires the US be able to use force preventively to eliminate emerging threats.2 The expanded concept of self-defence inherent the doctrine of preemption raised alarms international policy circles, heightened by the fact it coincided with a renewed US focus on Iraq. In an address to the UN general assembly on the anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the United States, President George W. Bush moved the threat to international security posed by to the top of the international policy agenda. That speech is now widely remembered for the president's challenge to the relevance of the United Nations and its security council.' The events ensued are well known. After protracted debates, the security council adopted resolution 1441, which found Iraq has been and remains material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions and gave a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations. Upon renewed inspections to assess Iraq's performance, the council would reconvene in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance...in order to secure international peace and security. The resolution recalled that the council has repeatedly warned it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations. Resolution 1441 was a compromise between the position of France and Germany and of the US and UK. While the former countries contended the resolution established a two-step process for any potential invasion of Iraq, the latter claimed its language left open the possibility of action by member states without a further resolution. US and UK officials nonetheless returned to the security council at the beginning of February 2003 to argue the resumed weapons inspections were not succeeding and remained a serious threat to international peace and …