Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program: From Coercive Diplomacy to Missile Diplomacy

Abstract

Iran’s ballistic missile program can be considered an integral part of its nuclear strategy, because ballistic missiles are capable of carrying multiple warheads. This is why the Iranian missile issue is considered one of the most prominent international issues that can destabilize the region and the world. Consequently, the international community, led by the US, has been trying to reduce this risk since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) through a policy of coercive diplomacy. This paper is an attempt to assess the level of effectiveness of coercive diplomacy in resolving the Iranian missile case from the signing of the JCPOA deal in July 2015 until July 2023. It indicates that the policy has not been highly successful in achieving its aims, and Iran has continued its efforts to increase its missile capabilities, pursuing missile diplomacy in order to achieve its regional and international goals. This study employs a qualitative methodology. The findings highlight that coercive diplomacy fails to compel Iran to abandon its missile program and, instead, incentivizes Iran to further develop its missile capabilities.