IPO performance under low information asymmetry and low agency conflicts: The case of demutualized insurers

Abstract

One of the hypotheses put forth to explain the post-issue underperformance of IPO stocks is that managers take advantage of windows of opportunity by timing the offerings when shares are overvalued. This study investigates the hypothesis by examining the post-IPO performance of insurance firms that went public after going through a process called demutualization, a structural conversion from mutual to stock company. Because the demutualization process is highly regulated, managers of these insurers have little discretion to time the issue. Furthermore, the demutualization process is very transparent so these IPOs should have lower information asymmetry. Empirical results show that, on average, demutualized insurance IPOs do not exhibit poor performance compare to various benchmarks. The results yield indirect support to the notion that managers of other types of IPO firms take advantage of “window of opportunity” which, in turn, leads to poor long-run performance