Involuntary Voluntary Action

Abstract

Voluntariness is an essential factor in determining if someone should be held legally responsible for his actions. Equally, voluntary actions of the victim in certain situations can break the chain of causation, thus removing criminal liability from the defendant. To create the desired certainty in the law a clear definition of voluntary action is essential, however, this article highlights how such a definition remains elusive. The binding ratio in Kennedy, that a victim's free, informed and deliberate actions can break the chain of causation, has been applied in an inconsistent way in R v Wallace. As a consequence, the law relies on a moralistic judgment in determining whether a defendant should be criminally liable for his actions. Thus, causing complexity and confusion in determining when actions can be deemed voluntary. R v Field has caused further uncertainty by holding that voluntarily choosing to drink whisky can be said to be an involuntary action. It is concluded that R v Field could have instead been viewed more clearly through the lens of omissions. This would have enabled established legal principles to be applied without the resulting challenges that R v Field has caused in determining what is voluntary action.