Involuntary Emotional Expressive Disorder: A Case for a Deeper Neuroethics

Abstract

Understanding why we produce labels for neuropsychiatric conditions, such as Alzheimer's disease (AD), and how we use those words to tell stories about our brain, as well as which groups control such diagnostic discourse, is important to a wise understanding of our cognitive abilities, their limitations, and even our very human nature. Here, we explore the history and current focus of a newly emerging field called neuroethics and explore its relationship (or lack thereof) to a newly created clinical syndrome called involuntary emotional expressive disorder (IEED). The main argument concerns the lack of neuroethical discussion of issues pertinent to social influences on disease and the construction of professional specialization. We are critical of the processes associated with the creation of both the field and the syndrome, and express concern about their eventual outcomes. The interaction of social, political, and business institutions, the inherent interests of the advancement of larger research projects (and the individuals that compose them), their potential for profit, and other incentives to enhance marketability and public attention toward certain research programs will be examined as we discuss the development of the field of neuroethics. Similarly, we argue that these social factors and forces are instrumental in the development of IEED as a recognizable category and condition. Our critique is guided by the hope that through such analyses we can improve our understanding of how we go about our academic activities in cognitive neuroscience and also improve our efforts to help people suffering from neuropsychiatric conditions, such as dementia.