Investment Promotive Effects of Mega-FTAs on the Cooperative Game for Eurasia Initiative

Abstract

The policy choices of Eurasian states whether to form a coalition along with the “Eurasia Initiative” can be explained by the cooperative game theory. While the each bilateral relationship before making a binding agreement seems to be a non-cooperative game, the coalitions with many other states through a binding agreement of Mega-FTA would be a cooperative game. Despite the lack of numerical data, this study at least tries to show the possibility of applying the game theory to analyze the “Eurasia Initiative” and it’s the impacts of Mega-FTAs on this ambition. While the Eurasia Initiative necessarily involves some economic projects requiring enough investment promotion, Korea can strategically set up the policies linked with the development of Mega-FTAs. To utilize the investment promotive effect of Mega-FTAs, Korea has to assure that the core of the cooperation game would be the grand coalition of a Mega-FTA. If it continues to search for the best policies to maximize the superadditivity of this cooperative game, Korea will finally be able to achieve the co-promotion of Mega-FTAs and the Eurasia Initiative.