Abstract
The paper examines the anti-fake investment for the branded product market. Through the analysis of the special branded market, the conditions for the sustainable naturalized anti-fake equilibrium and subsidized anti-fake equilibrium are given. The paper shows that when the profit loss with entry deterrence is small, naturalized anti-fake equilibrium exists. When profit loss is intermediate, subsidized equilibrium exists. However, when profit loss with entry deterrence is really large, it would be beneficial to the society to have some degree of fake product and antifake is harmful to the society.
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