Abstract
Gas/liquid two-phase stratified flows in horizontal channels are frequently encountered in nuclear reactors, oil and gas pipelines, steam generators, refrigeration equipment, reflux condensers, packed columns, and heat pipes. The phenomenon known as countercurrent flow limitation, or flooding, is the limiting condition where the flow rates of neither the gas nor the liquid can be further increased without changing the flow pattern. This is the condition where the maximum air mass flow rate at which the down-flowing water mass flow rate is equal to the inlet water mass flow rate. This limiting condition, also known as onset of flooding, can occur in vertical or horizontal geometry. This work is a review of recent experimental investigations of countercurrent flow limitation (CCFL) for various hot-leg geometries of pressurized water reactors (PWRs). We compare results with those obtained from the Nuclear Technology Development Centre (CDTN) in 2005. Recent experimental results in the literature are in good agreement with the 2005 findings.
Highlights
Countercurrent flows of water and steam are critically important in safety analysis of nuclear reactors
Understanding countercurrent flows of water and steam is critical for safety analysis of nuclear reactors
Countercurrent flow limitation (CCFL) can occur in the hot-leg of a PWR reactor during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA), or during a loss of residual heat removal in the system
Summary
Countercurrent flows of water and steam are critically important in safety analysis of nuclear reactors. Countercurrent flow limitation (CCFL), or flooding, refers to a condition in which gas flow dominates liquid flow in the opposite direction. This phenomenon is observed in several devices found in the chemical and mechanical industries. Understanding countercurrent flows of water and steam is critical for safety analysis of nuclear reactors The Three Mile Island accident in 1979 highlighted the importance of CCFL for reactor safety. Because of CCFL, no coolant flowed from the pressurizer to the primary circuit during the accident at Unit 2
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