Investigating interest group representation on the Pacific Fisheries Management Council

Abstract

A pervasive argument has emerged in debates over US ocean fishery policy that the policy-making process has generally been captured by commercial industry interests and consequently permits fishing quotas beyond sustainable harvesting levels. While it is clear that commercial interests are over-represented relative to recreational interests on the regional councils that set fishery policy, it is not clear whether commercial interests necessarily enact unsustainable policies. This paper examines the vote choices of representatives on the Pacific Fisheries Management Council by creating a spatial map of ideal point locations of voting members during the years 2006–2009 and then identifying voting coalitions. If a dominance by commercial interests leads to unsustainable policies, then it must be the case that members of this interest group vote as a cohesive and distinct bloc. In the end, however, it is shown that a geographic explanation for vote choices outperforms an interest group explanation. ► Vote choices made by members of the Pacific Fisheries Management Council are largely similar within state coalitions. ► Vote choices are largely dissimilar within interest group designations. ► Overall, state-based explanations for vote choices outperform interest group explanations. ► Arguments over reforms to the Regional Fisheries Management Councils must utilize empirical evidence.